A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to serve; it damages its own integrity and operation. It breeds distrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens and mocks their loyalty. 
INTRODUCTION
On June 10, 1997, Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, a former leader of the Black Panther Party who had been convicted in 1972 of a 1968 murder-robbery, was freed on bail after a California state judge ordered a new trial. 4 The new trial order represented the culmination of more than two decades of appeals and denied writs. 5 Pratt, who has always maintained his innocence, asserted that he was framed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of an attempt to destroy the Black Panthers. 6 The judge granted Pratt a new trial be-DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213 cause his conviction was "tainted by the prosecutor's failure to reveal that a crucial witness was also a police and FBI informer." 7 Critical to Pratt's receiving a new trial were several requests made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 8 Pratt's FOIA requests revealed that Julius Butler, a key prosecution witness who had testified that Pratt had confessed to committing the murder, had provided police and FBI agents with information on the Black Panthers for almost two and a half years preceding the Pratt trial. 9 Since Butler had denied under oath that he had ever been a police or FBI informant, this information would have enabled Pratt's defense attorneys to impeach his credibility. 10 The effect that this information could have had on Pratt's 1972 trial is demonstrated by the fact that several jurors in that original trial have since stated that they would not have voted to convict Pratt if they had known that Butler was an informant.
11
Pratt's FOIA requests also turned up FBI documents that showed that FBI director J. Edgar Hoover had ordered that Pratt and other prominent Panther members be "neutralized."
12 Pratt also discovered documents that supported his contention that he was in Oakland on the night of the murder. 13 The impact of the documents Pratt and his attorneys procured through FOIA is clear; without FOIA, Pratt would still be in jail.
14 [The Black Panther Party was] at the center of the bull's-eye.'"); see also Clarence Page, Commentary, Time for a New Peek at Old FBI Files, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1997, at 21 ("Pratt always had maintained that the FBI knew he was innocent because it allegedly had him under surveillance in Oakland when the murder occurred in Santa Monica."). M. Wesley Swearingen, a 25-year FBI veteran, supports Pratt's view, contending that wiretap logs placed Pratt in Oakland at the time of the murder but that "someone had destroyed these logs." M. WESLEY SWEARINGEN, FBI SECRETS: AN AGENT'S EXPOSÉ 86 (1995) .
7. Booth, supra note 4, at A1. 12. See Tony Jones, Cochran: Past, Present Future, TRI-STATE DEFENDER, May 10, 1995, at 1A. A retired FBI agent has corroborated these documents, stating that Pratt was "framed as part of the FBI's now-defunct counter intelligence program-covert efforts to 'neutralize' what they called 'black hate groups.'" Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note 6, at A1.
13. See Booth, supra note 4, at A1. 14. On January 30, 1998, Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti appealed Pratt's release, arguing that "nothing points to Pratt's innocence; everything points to his guilt." Boyer, D.A. Appeals, supra note 11, at B1. The Los Angeles Times characterized Garcetti's decision to appeal as "unwise" and "a fool's errand." Editorial, Misguided Move Against Pratt, If Geronimo Pratt's story were the norm, FOIA's usefulness would be beyond debate. For every one case like Geronimo Pratt's, however, there are many cases like that of Frank Jimenez. Jimenez, a prisoner at the Oxford Federal Correctional Institution in Wisconsin, has submitted numerous FOIA requests which appear to have done nothing but waste the government's time and resources. Jimenez sought all records held by eight separate executive agencies that were "in any way connected to, related to or even remotely in reference to his name." 15 For example, Jimenez requested the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to provide "all records concerning himself regarding mail he received in the states of Wisconsin and Illinois."
16 Government agencies must undertake a serious search in response to each FOIA request, and the burden is on the agencies to establish that materials have not been improperly withheld. 17 The USPS, therefore, performed an "exhaustive but unfruitful" search of its records. 18 Similarly, Jimenez's request to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) turned up no responsive records-a result which was hardly surprising since the ATF had not been involved in the investigation or prosecution of Jimenez. 19 The FBI, however, had more difficulty responding to Jimenez's FOIA request. Citing extremely limited resources and a backlog of 3,080 requests ahead of Jimenez's, the FBI moved to stay the proceedings to give it until March 2000 to process the request. 20 Unconvinced that Jimenez's request was necessary or urgent, the district court agreed with the FBI that the L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at B6. If the appeal fails, most legal observers believe that the prosecution will be unable to win a new trial since Butler has been discredited and the only eyewitness is now dead. See Boyer, Pratt Strides into Freedom, supra note 6, at A1. ("What the agency must show beyond material doubt is that it has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.").
18. The use of FOIA by prisoners such as Frank Jimenez and Geronimo Pratt highlights the benefits and problems of the statute. One of FOIA's purposes is to enable people to expose government action to "the light of public scrutiny." 22 In Pratt's case, the government had paid an informant and then improperly withheld this information which, had it been disclosed at trial, may well have led to an acquittal. Twenty-five years later, Pratt was able to use FOIA to expose that improper government action and to use the previously withheld information to regain his freedom. In contrast, Jimenez's experience shows how FOIA can be abused at enormous cost to American taxpayers and illustrates the delays that can occur as understaffed federal agencies struggle to respond to requests for information that the agencies may or may not possess. 23 This Note surveys recent FOIA cases which illustrate the delays that have come to plague FOIA administration. In 1996, in an effort to cure these delays and update FOIA for the computer age, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 (E-FOIA). 24 This Note analyzes the major provisions 21 . See id. at 31-32. FOIA permits courts to grant time extensions under certain conditions: "If the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the records." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1994 1 (1992) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("FOIA proves that the best way to combat the coverups, the mistakes, and the secret policies that undermine faith in our democratic system is to expose them to public view."), and Jane Kirtley, Freedom of Information Act-How Is It Working?, COMM. LAW., Fall 1996, at 7, 9 [hereinafter Kirtley, FOIA] (arguing that oversight by the press and the public "provides the only independent assurance that the rights of the individual are being preserved"), and Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1299 (1996) ("Access to information . . . ensures for the individual citizen a sense of empowerment and control over a government that can at times appear monolithic and imperious."), with Scalia, supra note 1, at 19 ("The defects of the Freedom of Information Act cannot be cured as long as we are dominated by the obsession that gave them birth-that the first line of defense against an arbitrary executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and its surrogate, the press.").
24 that the government would be open. In the vanguard of the freedom of information movement was the press, a group that had historically encountered administrative roadblocks in its quest to inform the public about questionable governmental practices. 28 Despite the press's traditional role as the public's watchdog, legal complications were depriving the press of its "most vital raw material"-public records and proceedings. 29 Frustrated by the lack of an enforceable legal right to examine public records, reporters had to rely upon "the favorable exercise of official grace or indulgence or 'discretion. '" 30 The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 31 fundamentally changed the way that requests for information were handled by creating a presumption in favor of disclosure and by requiring agencies to justify any nondisclosure. 32 Prior to FOIA, the release of governmental records was governed largely by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 33 which required only that public records be made available to "persons properly and directly concerned," and exempted the nebulous category "information held confidential for NO. 93-876, at 2 (1974) ("An informed public makes the difference between mob rule and democratic government. If the pertinent and necessary information on government activities is denied the public, the result is a weakening of the democratic process and the ultimate atrophy of our form of government.") (quoting Letter of William L. Dawson)), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.C.A.N 6267, 6268; Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) ("A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."), reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
28. See Wald, supra note 25, at 650 & n.4 (discussing the press's frequent encounters with "government agencies' random, unexplained denials of access to information about crucial decisions, denials which had covered up the mistakes or irregularities of the time" 40 The amendments significantly reduced agencies' discretion over whether to release information 41 and eliminated inefficiencies in the processing of requests "in order to contribute to the fuller and faster release of information, which is the basic objective of the Act."
42 Unfortunately, Congress did not anticipate a major effect of its alterations: after the 1974 amendments, the number of FOIA requests skyrocketed. 43 Prior to the changes, Congress had estimated that the new amendments would cost the government about $50,000 for the first year, and $100,000 for each of the following five years. 44 The actual costs of FOIA quickly and dramatically surpassed these conservative estimates. 45 By 1991, FOIA's annual expense totaled $91 million, 46 and in 1992, the figure had increased to $108 million. These dramatic increases came about because of a change in FOIA's fee provisions. 48 Prior to 1974, an agency could charge requesters for the costs of searching for responsive documents, reviewing documents for exempted information that the agency could then delete, and duplicating the documents that were to be released. 49 The 1974 amendments limited fees to "reasonable standard charges for document search and duplication and provide [d] for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and duplication." 50 The change forced agencies to bear the cost of reviewing documents for exempted material. This review process is the most expensive part of processing FOIA requests because it often requires the use of highly trained agency personnel. 51 For example, documents requested by prisoners are typically investigative files that may contain references to a confidential source, 52 or material that, if released, could reasonably result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 53 In processing such a request, someone familiar with the investigation must go through the documents "line by line to delete those portions, and only those portions, that would disclose a confidential source or come within one of the other specific exceptions to the requirement of disclosure." Hatch, one of the Act's sponsors, estimated that if agencies could charge commercial requesters for the cost of document review, the agencies would be able to collect up to $60 million per year in additional fees. 57 The amendments established a three-tiered fee system, dividing requests into (1) requests for commercial use; (2) noncommercial requests by the news media or by educational or scientific institutions whose purpose is scholarly or scientific; and (3) all other non-commercial requests. 58 For category (1) requests, agencies may assess charges for document search, duplication, and review. 59 For category (2) requests, agencies may only assess document duplication charges. 60 For category (3) requests, agencies may assess search and document duplication charges but not charges for review. 61 In addition, category (2) and (3) requesters may not be charged for the first two hours of search time or the first 100 pages of duplication.
62
Regardless of which category the request falls into, no fee may be charged if the costs of collecting or processing the fee would likely exceed the amount of the fee. 63 Finally, if a requester has previously failed to pay fees in a timely manner or if the agency determines that the fee will exceed $250, the agency may require advance payment of the expected fee.
64
The 1986 Reform Act also clarified the circumstances under which a fee waiver is appropriate. The 1974 FOIA amendments required documents to be furnished at a reduced rate or at no charge when the agency determined that doing so was "in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public." 65 In interpreting this section, courts had given agencies broad discretion to determine whether to grant a pected changes in FOIA fees created by the 1986 Reform Act).
57. 
1998]
REPAVING THE FOIA ROAD TO FREEDOM 1223 fee waiver. 66 The 1986 Reform Act narrowed the definition of "public interest," so that an agency must grant a fee waiver only when disclosure of information "is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 67 The Act also changed the standard of review so that courts would review an agency's fee waiver determination de novo. 68 The fee provisions that the 1986 Reform Act established draw the proper balance between keeping government activities open to the light of public scrutiny and fiscal realities. Requesters whose primary interest in certain government information is commercial should pay the government the entire price of collecting, reviewing, and disclosing that information. Similarly, requesters whose primary purpose is to inform the public about governmental activities should be able to procure such information with minimal costs. Unfortunately, despite these fee provisions, backlogs and delays continue to exist.
69

II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE STATUTORY COMMANDS WITH FISCAL REALITIES
The inadequacy of congressional attempts to ameliorate the problems surrounding FOIA's administration, coupled with agencies' inability to handle the huge influx of requests due to woeful underfunding and understaffing, left the judiciary to sort out the mess. Since the passage of the 1974 amendments, courts have granted besieged agencies tremendous time extensions and, relying on early legislative history, have interpreted FOIA to allow agencies to withhold more information than they previously could. The first case in which a court intervened to permit understaffed federal agencies to take more time to process FOIA requests was Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 70 In Open America, a public interest group, a law professor, and several law students sought documents relating to a former Acting Director of the FBI's role in the Watergate scandal. 71 After the FBI received the request, it notified the plaintiffs that there were 5,137 FOIA requests in front of theirs. 72 The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to require detailed justification, itemization, and indexing of documents within thirty days. 73 The government appealed, arguing that the FBI had exercised "due diligence" in processing the FOIA requests, but that "exceptional circumstances" existed that prevented it from processing them within the statutory time limits. 74 In such circumstances, the 1974 FOIA amendments state, "the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the records." 75 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, citing the language and legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments, vacated the district court's order. 76 According to FOIA at that time, an agency that received a request for information had to determine whether it would grant or deny that request within ten days. 77 In "unusual circumstances," however, the agency was permitted an additional ten working days. 78 After that period, the requester was deemed to have . See E-FOIA, supra note 24, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1996)). These changes are discussed infra Part III.A.5.
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1994). "Unusual circumstances" included: (i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or (iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, exhausted his administrative remedies 79 and could bring an action in district court to compel production of the documents. 80 The agency could obtain a stay in the proceedings, however, and thus gain additional time to review the records, if it could "show [that] exceptional circumstances exist [ed] and that the agency [was] exercising due diligence in responding to the request." 81 In Open America, the D.C. Circuit examined the legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments and determined that Congress inserted the "exceptional circumstances" language of section 552(a)(6)(C) "as a safety valve after the protests of the [Ford] administration that the rigid limits of [sections 552(a)(6)] (A) and (B) might prove unworkable." 82 The court stated that "exceptional circumstances" exist when an agency "is deluged with a volume of requests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress, [and] the existing resources are inadequate to deal with the volume of such requests within the time limits of subsection (6)(A)."
83 Applied to the facts, the court found that the FBI's expenditure of $2,675,000 in processing FOIA requests in 1976, a year in which Congress had anticipated that FOIA would cost the entire government only $100,000, constituted "exceptional circumstances." 84 It further found that the agency's use of a two-track system to handle simple and complex requests on separate "first-in, first-out" bases satisfied the "due diligence" requirement. 85 Since the plaintiffs alwith another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein. 89 Five days later, the USAO notified Edmond that his request would be handled in the order in which it was received.
Id. § § 552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(iii
90
When Edmond had received no documents by December 1994, he wrote a letter to the USAO asking about the status of his request.
91
The USAO's response explained that his request would be handled in its turn but noted that the agency was unable to give a specific date for completion of its processing of the request.
92 Edmond and the USAO exchanged similar letters in 1995 and 1996. 93 Having received no documents and still in prison, Edmond finally resorted to filing suit in district court on October 15, 1996. The USAO refused to give a specific date was given despite explicit statutory instructions that required it to do so:
The time limits . . . may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched. No such notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than ten working days. The USAO, estimating that the records responsive to Edmond's request consisted of 2,000 pages, and noting that there were thirtyone requests in front of Edmond's, asked the district court for an additional two years to process his request. 95 The district court held that, based on the record before it, the USAO had satisfied the "exceptional circumstances" test as defined in Open America.
96 It further held that the USAO's use of a "first-in, first-out" system satisfied the due diligence requirement. 97 The court noted that a stay would not be appropriate if Edmond could make a showing of "exceptional need or urgency," which the court defined as "potential jeopardy to . . . life or personal safety, or to substantial due process rights."
98 Edmond asserted that the requested documents contained exculpatory material that would aid him in overturning his criminal conviction. 99 The court held, however, that unless Edmond could "provide an adequate showing" that it was likely that the requested documents contained "materially exculpatory information," he was not entitled to priority processing of his FOIA request. 100 Since Edmond had not made such a showing, he was not entitled to priority processing. 101 The court was not satisfied, however, that it would take the government two years to process the thirty-one requests in front of Edmond's. 102 The court therefore granted the government only one additional year to complete the processing of Edmond's request, "with an opportunity to seek a further extension if necessary at a later date."
103
Edmond raises several troubling issues concerning the state of FOIA law. First, Edmond had already been waiting four and a half years for the information when the district court granted the agency additional time to respond to the request. 104 While it is true that the There are strong policy arguments on both sides of the debate over expedited processing for prisoner FOIA requests. On the one hand, prisoners are among the most litigious classes of citizens in the country, 111 and granting their requests priority review without requiring some additional showing that the requests are likely to uncover exculpatory information could have a crippling effect on the efficient functioning of FOIA. On the other hand, uncovering exculpatory material that was improperly withheld by the government is, perhaps, the quintessential example of why FOIA is needed in a supposedly just society. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
119 In that case, a CBS news correspondent had sought the criminal records of organized crime figure Charles Medico and three members of his family.
120
Medico's family business had been investigated by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission for allegedly obtaining several defense contracts through improper ties with a corrupt congressman. 121 The CBS reporter asserted that information concerning past crimes by Medico would potentially be "a matter of special public interest." 122 The issue was whether Medico's criminal rap sheet was exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 7(C), 123 which permits an agency to withhold a document when disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 124 To determine whether the invasion of privacy that would result from disclosure was warranted, the Supreme Court used a balancing test, weighing Medico's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. 125 The Court refused, however, to give the alleged public interest much weight in the balance, stating instead that:
[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some public interest in anyone's criminal history, especially if the history is in some way related to the subject's dealing with a public official or agency, the FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed. 126 The Court concluded that the public interest in the information sought by the reporter simply fell "outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve." 127 In the context of the privacy-public interest balancing test, this requirement that requested information open governmental activities "to the sharp eye of public scrutiny" has subsequently been referred to as the "central purpose" doctrine. 150. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 4, 110 Stat. at 3049 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)). If an agency does not have the means necessary to publish the materials on the Web, the agency would be able to satisfy the requirements of this section by making the records available on CD-ROM or diskette. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3463. The records that are to be made available for public inspection by electronic means are:
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register;
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public;
(D) copies of all records, regardless of form or format, which have been released to any person . . . and which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the same records; and designed to promote access to government information via the Internet, 151 creates what Attorney General Janet Reno termed "electronic reading rooms."
152 Of the documents subject to this provision, the type that will be of most interest to the general public and that has the greatest potential for reducing the total number of FOIA requests are copies of previously released records that are likely to be the subject of subsequent requests. 153 In the FBI's electronic reading room, 154 for example, documents posted in compliance with this provision include information of popular interest on such topics as Elvis Presley, 155 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, 156 and various UFO sightings.
157
Some FOIA observers have argued that this provision will lead to extensive litigation since "a requester who disagrees with an agency's assessment of the likelihood of future requests may be able to sue to challenge that assessment." 158 The merits of this argument are questionable for two reasons. First, it is difficult to imagine how an individual would have standing to challenge the agency's assessment, since the individual would not have suffered any concrete harm as a result of an agency decision not to make a particular document or set of documents available in electronic reading rooms. 159 see also MacDonald, supra note 150, at 382 (arguing that the provision will likely result in an "explosion of litigation").
159. An agency's assessment would not be aimed at anyone in particular, and an individual DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213 E-FOIA leaves to agency discretion the determination of which records are likely to become the subject of repeated requests. 160 Since courts have historically shown great deference to the exercise of agency discretion in the context of FOIA, 161 any challenge to an agency determination likely will be unsuccessful.
Critics also argue that agencies may divert resources to publishing older, previously released documents at the expense of processing current requests. 162 This argument cynically assumes that agencies will act in bad faith and will actively attempt to delay FOIA processing. The creation of these electronic reading rooms has a tremendous potential for making important information readily available to the general public. 168 The electronic reading rooms will also save time and money for agencies, as they will be able to unburden themselves of requests by multiple persons for similar information. 169 the requester sought to obtain from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a computer tape which listed the names and addresses of the participants in six 1982 BLM Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leasing lotteries. 172 The Agency was willing to make the information available on microfiche, but the requester argued that Clinton administration's record is "mixed," but emphasizing that it is "an improvement upon the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations").
167 Congress -1996 (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/annual_report/1996/96-sp.htm>. There is a risk, of course, that future administrations will revert to a more restrictive FOIA policy. If that scenario becomes a reality, the courts could intervene and set reasonable limitations on agency discretion. Agencies would still be subject to FOIA's time limits, and if, as a result of diverting resources to post previously released material, an agency took too long responding to newer requests, the courts could compel disclosure and require the agency to shift resources back to processing current requests.
168. The system is by no means perfect, however. For example, when I examined some FBI information on UFOs, the documents on the screen were barely legible due to the condition of the original documents. the computer tape version would be more convenient for his purposes. 173 The district court held that release on microfiche was sufficient. 174 The court stated that the Agency was only required to provide "responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably accessible form." 175 The district court's decision seriously undermined the effectiveness of FOIA in the electronic age. By not releasing information in the requested format, an agency can substantially decrease the usefulness of the information to the requester, sometimes effectively denying access to the information.
176 For information-seekers looking for "trends, abuses and outrages," electronic searching of government material can reduce search times from days or weeks to hours or minutes. 177 An illustration of how important format can be is the Environmental Working Group's (EWG) request to the FDA for pesticide monitoring results. 178 The EWG, a nonprofit organization, wanted certain data to enable it to "analyze the variance between levels of toxins that are inherent in imported foods consumed by infants and children, as compared to adults." 179 The FDA refused to release the data in electronic form, instead releasing the data in the "unwieldy physical form of [6,000 pages of] paper documents," a form that was "cumbersome, confusing, and unorganized [sic] for the efficient statistical analysis necessary for quality scientific research." 180 The EWG was able to complete its project, but only at an unnecessarily high cost: 
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The FDA's decision left the EWG with no choice other than to bear the financial burden of paying a commercial scanning firm to input the pesticide data. Then, the EWG had to go through the labor intensive chore of converting the data into suitable electronic format-the very format that the FDA maintained all along.
181
E-FOIA will prevent such inefficiencies from occurring in the future by requiring agencies to provide a requested record "in any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format."
182 This provision was intended to override the holding in Dismukes, 183 and the new language should increase the usefulness and efficiency of FOIA.
First In/First Out and Multi-Track Processing.
Courts have permitted agencies to process FOIA requests on a first in/first out (FIFO) basis.
184 FIFO processing standing alone is problematic, however, because simple requests that could be processed rapidly are delayed while earlier, more complex requests are handled. 185 In the interest of efficiency and speed, some agencies, such as the FBI, have set up two-track systems-dividing requests into simple and complex requests-which are processed on separate FIFO bases.
186 E-FOIA gives agencies statutory authority to establish such multi-track systems, but it does not require the establishment of such systems.
187
Since some agencies had already established multi-track systems, this development is not very momentous; the multi-tracking option in the statute will, at most, give agencies that do not currently use multitracking a reason to consider whether they might benefit from such a system. While the lack of explicit guidelines has drawn some criticism, 188 it would be unwise to require all agencies to set up a uniform multi-tracking system since lengthy delays do not plague every agency.
189 By permitting individual agencies to design their own systems, E-FOIA allows each agency to tailor a processing system to its distinct needs. For example, an agency with a severe backlog might want to create three tracks and assign its most experienced personnel to the track containing the most complex requests. Other agencies with only minor backlogs might prefer a two-track system, or even a single-track system. Encouraging agencies to set their own 181 rules regarding multi-track systems will likely encourage experimentation. Through this process, agencies will learn which procedures work best, and will be able to borrow from other agencies' experiences with various systems.
4. Expedited Review. Occasionally, a FOIA requester will have an urgent need for the requested information, and delays in processing the request can have serious consequences. 190 In response, E-FOIA requires agencies to set up a system of expedited processing for cases where the requester demonstrates a "compelling need." 191 This requirement can be met in one of two ways. First, a compelling need is present when "a failure to obtain requested records on an expedited basis . . . could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual."
192 This provision will help minimize the most severe kinds of adverse effects which delays in FOIA can have on requesters. Furthermore, since it is doubtful that many people will be able to meet the provision's high standard, 193 it is unlikely that the provision will result in serious delays to the processing of non-expedited requests. Since an agency's denial of a request for expedited review is subject to judicial review, Second, for requesters that are "primarily engaged in disseminating information," the compelling need requirement may be satisfied by a showing of "urgency to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity."
196 The media will be the primary beneficiary of this provision, and it is reasonable to expect that reporters will attempt to invoke it frequently. FOIA critics have found fault with the statute precisely because it is no longer used primarily by the media to inquire into the activities of the government. 197 While this provision will not prevent non-media requesters from using FOIA, and thus does not directly respond to these critics' concerns, it will give certain media requests preferential processing, thereby making FOIA work more effectively for the media. Accelerating media access to information on government activities is a positive development for FOIA. Since one of FOIA's original objectives was to "open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,"
198 it is both
195. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
196. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II) (Supp. II 1996)).
197. See, e.g., Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A "Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995) (lamenting the fact that "FOIA has rarely if ever been used as a powerful external check on governmental affairs," and noting that "the typical FOIA request is made by a wily civil litigant circumventing traditional discovery rules, a corporate counsel in search of competitor's financial information, or a conspiracy theorist demanding operational files of the [CIA] on himself or other players in covert intelligence maneuvers in Cuba"); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16 ("[FOIA was] promoted as a boon to the press, the public interest group, the little guy; [it has] been used most frequently by corporate lawyers. . . . [The current situation] is a far cry from John Q. Public finding out how his government works."). Perhaps the most scathing and extensive critique of FOIA was delivered by Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman, in 1988:
Today, a typical FOIA scenario is not, as envisioned by the Congress, the journalist who seeks information about the development of public policy which he will shortly publish for the edification of the electorate. Rather, it is the corporate lawyer seeking business secrets of a client's competitors; the felon attempting to learn who it was who informed against him; the drug trafficker trying to evade the law; the foreign requester seeking a benefit that our citizens cannot obtain from his country; or the private litigant who, constrained by discovery limitations, turns to the FOIA to give him what a trial court will not. reasonable and desirable to give preferential treatment to requests that are intended to publicize governmental activities.
Twenty-Day Time Limit.
Prior to the passage of E-FOIA, an agency was required to determine whether it would comply with a request for information within ten days of its receipt of the request.
199
Agency disregard for the time limits prompted strident criticism from observers such as Senator Patrick Leahy, author of the Senate version of E-FOIA. When testifying before the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Leahy complained:
The current time limits in the FOIA are a joke. Few agencies actually respond to FOIA requests within the 10-day limit required in the law. Such routine failure to comply with the statutory time limits is bad for morale in the agencies and breeds contempt by citizens who expect government officials to abide by, not routinely break, the law.
200
In an attempt to remedy the problem, Congress doubled the statutory time limit from ten days to twenty days. 201 The expansion of the time limit was intended to "help Federal agencies in reducing their backlog of FOIA requests." 202 Congress's recognition of the need for expanded time limits is commendable, and the new provision likely will enable agencies with only minor backlogs to process requests within the statutory limits. 203 Unfortunately, a twenty-day limit is barely more realistic than a ten-day limit for agencies such as the FBI or the CIA, whose enormous backlogs draw the most criticism. While these agencies may be able to process some of their smaller, simpler FOIA requests within the twenty-day limit by util-199. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1994). 200. 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also Sinrod, supra note 44, at 342 (noting that "compliance with FOIA's ten-day rule has become the exception rather than the norm"); Beall, supra note 23, at 1254 n.14 (" 203. There is a risk, however, that the new time limits will slow down some FOIA processing since agencies that currently respond within ten days will no longer have the pressure to comply within ten days. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 75.
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REPAVING THE FOIA ROAD TO FREEDOM 1243 izing a multi-track system, 204 their backlogs are several months long. 205 The FBI receives requests for law enforcement information that may fall within Exemption 7, 206 and the CIA receives requests for information that may be covered under the National Security Act and may thus be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3. 207 The FBI 208 and the CIA can actively invoke these exemptions to ensure effective law enforcement or to protect national security, thus necessitating close and extensive review of requested documents. 209 In view of these circumstances, it is unlikely that the expanded time limits will result in a substantial reduction of these agencies' backlogs. 210 Furthermore, the new twenty-day limit, like its ten-day predecessor, is rife with exceptions. E-FOIA maintains the provision for a ten-day extension in "unusual circumstances." 211 If it is unlikely that the agency will complete processing of the request within that time, the agency must only notify the requester and give that person the opportunity to limit the scope of the request so that it may be processed within the time limit. 212 If the agency fails to conform to the time limits, irrespective of whether the requester chose to limit the scope of his request, the requester is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies and may bring suit in federal district court. 213 The district court has the power to allow the agency additional time to process the request, however, if the agency can show that "exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213 diligence in responding to the request." 214 Prior to the passage of E-FOIA, no statutory definition of "exceptional circumstances" existed, and the term was thus left to unbridled judicial construction. In an attempt to constrain what was seen as liberal judicial allowance of significant time extensions for agencies faced with request backlogs, 215 and to encourage agencies to reduce those backlogs, Congress explicitly stated in E-FOIA that "the term 'exceptional circumstances' does not include a delay that results from a predictable agency workload of requests under this section, unless the agency demonstrates reasonable progress in reducing its backlog of pending requests." 216 The new statutory language was intended to limit a judge's ability to give an agency additional time to respond to a request absent truly extraordinary circumstances, and thereby to coerce agencies into reducing their backlogs of requests. 217 The new statutory language is loose enough, however, to enable judges to continue to grant time extensions to beleaguered agencies. 218 While this reality is contrary to congressional intent, it is both unavoidable and desirable in view of the currently inadequate levels of agency funding for FOIA request processing. It would be problematic if a judge were forced by statute to compel disclosure of requested documents without giving the agency adequate time to review the documents to ensure that they do not contain exempted material. 219 The risks involved are particularly severe in regard to material that may contain information that must be kept secret for national security reasons, 220 or information whose disclosure would result in an invasion of privacy. 221. Such information is exempted from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. § § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). President Ford, when he initially vetoed the 1974 FOIA amendments, voiced such a concern:
I believe that confidentiality would not be maintained if many millions of pages of FBI and other investigatory law enforcement files would be subject to compulsory disclosure . . . . Our law enforcement agencies do not have, and could not obtain, the An application of the new statutory language to the facts of Edmond v. United States Attorney 222 illustrates the ease with which judges could continue to grant time extensions to underfunded agencies. First, while the statute explicitly states that "the term 'exceptional circumstances' does not include a delay that results from a predictable agency workload of requests,"
223 Congress did not define "predictable agency workload." The district court in Edmond noted that the USAO had received "a volume of requests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress." 224 The judge could easily determine that such an unanticipated volume was not "predictable" under E-FOIA's language. Second, delays from a predictable agency workload can constitute exceptional circumstances if the agency "demonstrates reasonable progress in reducing its backlog of pending requests." 225 The statute leaves to the courts the job of determining what constitutes "reasonable progress." Courts could liberally construe this language to give agencies a fair opportunity to process requests. The Edmond court noted that the USAO had increased its FOIA staff from one to four people. 226 The court could consider this action to be "reasonable progress" toward reducing the agency's FOIA backlog under the new language. Third, if a FOIA requester had earlier refused to narrow the scope of his request or to arrange for an alternative timetable, 227 the judge must consider this refusal as a factor in determining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist.
228 Therefore, unless a requester was willing to narrow the scope of his request before the suit was filed, E-FOIA gives judges an additional means of granting liberal time extensions to agencies faced with understaffing and too many FOIA requests. large number of trained and knowledgeable personnel that would be needed to make such a line-by-line examination of information requests that sometimes involve hundreds of thousands of documents, within the time constraints added to current law by this bill. While it is unfortunate that people will have to be satisfied with less information if they want to receive it in a timely manner, such a result is unavoidable given Congress's refusal to allocate sufficient resources to agencies for FOIA processing.
B. E-FOIA's Likely Effect
Congress passed E-FOIA to accomplish two goals. The first goal, which it largely achieved, was to "encourage electronic access to Government information." 229 The requirement that agencies release as much information as possible in the format requested, including on CD-ROM or diskette, was a long-overdue step. 230 The provisions relating to on-line publication of government information promise to make information maintained and collected by the government more accessible to a larger segment of the American public. 231 The second goal, to encourage and assist reduction of agency backlogs of FOIA requests, will likely prove more elusive. Although increased funding for FOIA processing is the action most likely to reduce backlogs significantly, 232 such an increase was noticeably absent from the reforms. 233 The changes the amendments did accomplish will likely have a mixed effect on the backlogs. As agencies publish more information on the Internet, people will need to turn to FOIA less frequently to obtain desired information and multiple requests for the same information will certainly be reduced.
234 But FOIA will still continue to be widely used; agency FOIA processing teams will continue to be un-229. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 5 (1996) ; see also E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 2(a) (6) 233. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 384 (calling the failure to fund "[t]he first and primary failure" of E-FOIA). For a discussion of the Senate proposal to fund the amendments that was not passed, as well as other proposed ways to fund FOIA, see infra Part IV.B.
234. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 9 (1996) ("Government dissemination of more varieties and greater amounts of its information holdings via a 'superhighway' may reduce the volume of FOIA requests.").
derfunded and understaffed; and the time required to process requests will continue to result in backlogs. The provisions authorizing multi-tracking will probably speed up the processing of simpler requests, but the fact that the FBI had a system of multi-tracking in place prior to E-FOIA, 235 yet had one of the worst backlogs, 236 demonstrates that multi-tracking is not a panacea. It remains to be seen how expedited review will work in practice, because the amendments leave the details to agency regulations. 237 While the expedited processing provisions may lead to more litigation 238 and may increase overall delay and costs, 239 their benefits outweigh these drawbacks. Expedited review will secure rapid access to information for those requesters with the most urgent need for information, and it will accelerate the media's efforts to provide the public with important information about governmental activities. Finally, the twenty-day time limit may help agencies with minor backlogs, but it will have only a minor effect on agencies with the largest backlogs, and congressional attempts to limit the judiciary's ability to grant these agencies time extensions likely will be ineffective. Thus, since it is doubtful that E-FOIA will substantially improve the speed at which FOIA requests are processed, more invasive surgery is required.
IV. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS TO STREAMLINE FOIA
Congressional attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to reduce the cost and delays associated with FOIA were inadequate. Likewise, it appears that E-FOIA will not substantially accelerate agency processing of FOIA requests. These failures result from Congress's apparent 235. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27. 236. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,894 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that FOIA requests to the FBI can take up to four years to be processed).
237. See E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3051 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (Supp. II 1996)). For example, it is unknown how expedited review will function in combination with multi-track processing. One commentator suggests that an agency might put all other requests on hold so it can devote all of its FOIA resources to processing the expedited cases. See Gellman, E-FOIA Will Slow Down Agency Responses, supra note 148, at 27. One of the only firm requirements that the amendments place on agency regulations is that they ensure "expeditious consideration of administrative appeals of [the] determinations of whether to provide expedited processing." E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 8, 110 Stat. at 3052 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(ii)(II) (Supp. II 1996)).
238. Cf. Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 74 (noting that "virtually every word in the FOIA has been the subject of intense litigation").
239. See MacDonald, supra note 150, at 383 (arguing that the expedited review provisions "will add significant costs to administrative overhead" and will "further drain agency resources and slow down FOIA compliance overall"). DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1213 preference for administrative solutions, such as multi-track processing and expanded time limits. This focus on administrative improvements shifts the debate away from the underlying cause of FOIA's problems: a lack of adequate funding and staffing for agencies' FOIA-processing divisions. One group of scholars has suggested expanding the central purpose doctrine as a means of making FOIA more efficient and less costly. 240 Their claim is that this proposal would return the statute to its intended purpose as a tool for citizens to open governmental operations to the light of public scrutiny. 241 It would also avoid the need for additional funding. This Part examines this proposal as well as a funding provision that was in the original Senate E-FOIA bill 242 but that was not included in the final Act. These proposals are analyzed both for their potential effects on the cost and delays associated with FOIA and for their ability to conform to an overarching commitment to openness in government.
A. Returning FOIA to Its Roots: Expanding the Central Purpose Doctrine
Anyone may use FOIA to procure non-exempt information for any reason. 243 Some critics have attacked the absence of a purpose requirement because public dollars are not unlimited and other public causes may be more deserving. 244 The absence of such a requirement invites abuse, 245 (1996) . 243. The statute itself places no limitations on who may request records or for what reason. As long as the records do not fall within one of the statutory exemptions, an agency, "upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994) (emphases added). Courts have reaffirmed this basic principle of FOIA, noting that Congress "clearly intended the FOIA to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a special interest in a particular document. 244. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 17 (criticizing FOIA and its costs because requests that "may be motivated by no more than idle curiosity" take "money from the Treasury that could be better spent elsewhere").
245. See Scott Shane, Panning for Gold in Government Files: Businesses Make Most of Public Right to Know, BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1997, at 1A (noting that some people have really important enough to be there, [and] crowding out the genuinely desirable ones to the end of the line." 246 One possible solution to these problems is to expand the central purpose doctrine 247 beyond the realm of the privacy exemptions, empowering agencies to apply the doctrine directly to all FOIA requests received. 248 Advocates of a universal central purpose standard argue that it would dramatically reduce the costs and delays currently associated with FOIA. 249 Agencies could use the doctrine to decide quickly whether to deny a request as being outside the scope of FOIA, or whether to process the request more fully. Supporters argue that the doctrine would help eliminate FOIA abuses and would help return FOIA to its original purpose of enabling citizens to learn about the activities of government. 250 Such a proposal is theoretically feasible, given the apparent willingness within some federal courts to expand the central purpose doctrine beyond the privacy exemptions. 251 There are, however, several problems with such a proposal.
At a practical level, the current Congress appears to be moving away from limiting the scope of FOIA and has, in fact, reaffirmed its commitment to universal access to FOIA for any purpose. The findings accompanying E-FOIA explicitly state that "the purpose of 246. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 247. See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing the central purpose doctrine, which has been used to uphold the denial, based on the privacy exemptions, of FOIA requests that do not serve FOIA's "central purpose," which is to ensure access to information concerning the activities of government, not those of private citizens).
248. See Cate et al., supra note 118, at 67 ("The test for whether a request seeks 'official information' should be the touchstone for disclosure under FOIA. . . . [O] nly information that will serve the purpose of ensuring that 'the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny' should ever be subject to disclosure under the FOIA." (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774)). But see Beall, supra note 23, at 1279-80, 1300 (criticizing the central purpose doctrine as "contrary to the original spirit of FOIA," and expressing dismay over the doctrine's "exaltation of privacy doctrines" that erode "one of the central bulwarks to a free democracy," access to information).
249. Senator Leahy's comments illustrate his dissatisfaction with the central purpose doctrine. Nonetheless, the central purpose doctrine will likely survive within its present boundaries because nothing in the statute expressly prohibits courts from employing the doctrine as part of the privacy exemptions' balancing tests. 254 The legislative findings, however, may prevent courts from expanding the central purpose doctrine to other areas of FOIA, and they send a strong signal that Congress is not likely to limit the scope of FOIA in the near future.
A second practical problem with the proposed expansion of the central purpose doctrine is that agencies might exercise a broader power too expansively. Agency determinations would have to be reviewable by the courts, and this increased litigation would dramatically increase the costs and delays associated with FOIA-the very problems such a solution was intended to fix. 255 252. E-FOIA, supra note 24, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3048 (emphases added). 253. S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 24 (1996) (additional views of Senator Leahy) (citations omitted).
254. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the use of a balancing test. For example, under Exemption 7(C), material may be withheld if disclosure would result in an "unwarranted invasion" of privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1994) . In order to determine whether an invasion of privacy would be unwarranted, a court is forced to weigh the relative merits of the interest in disclosure and the privacy interest involved. See Dickinson, supra note 130, at 209-10 ("[B]y casting the personal privacy exemptions as balancing tests, Congress reintroduced into disclosure disputes the issue of merit."). Senator Leahy appears to have recognized this necessity. His attachment to the Senate report accompanying E-FOIA states that the requester's intended use can properly be considered when balancing the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interest. See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 27 (additional views of Senator Leahy). Most likely, any congressional attempt to fully overturn Reporters Committee and its progeny and to eliminate the central purpose doctrine would need to be more explicit.
255. One way to avoid such a problem would be to require FOIA requesters to state how the information they are requesting is likely to shed light on the activities and operations of the government. This type of initial purpose statement would assist agencies in making the initial A final practical problem is that requesters often do not know in advance what their requests will reveal. Thus, while it is true that FOIA is being used by corporate lawyers to conduct industrial espionage, 256 the information they obtain occasionally reveals hidden governmental abuses; 257 corporate requesters cannot anticipate these contents until after the agencies have disclosed the material and the requesters have had the opportunity to examine it. Thus, while such requesters may have selfish motives for making their requests, the public may benefit from the information as well. While such occasional indirect benefits may be difficult to justify given that government resources are limited, 258 the proper response to this problem is not to limit the scope of FOIA; the proper response was made in 1986 when FOIA's fee provisions were amended to shift the cost of processing primarily commercial requests to the requester. 259 It is unwise to place limits on who can use FOIA and for what purposes they can use it, because limiting a basic freedom can end up having the unintended consequence of hurting those who need it most.
260 Any initial limitation of a freedom facilitates subsequent limitations of that freedom; it is preferable not to start down that road.
Expansion of the central purpose doctrine would perform the undesired service of further tipping the scales toward government sedetermination. But see Cate et al., supra note 118, at 68 n.229 (arguing that a congressional attempt to limit the use of FOIA for purely private purposes by requiring that requesters demonstrate a "public purpose use" for the requested information would be ineffective and ultimately "unworkable").
256. See Wald, supra note 25, at 666. 257. See id. at 670 (noting the risk of "increas[ing] the cozy, closed door governmentbusiness dealings which were the very sort of practices the Act was designed to root out") (internal quotation marks omitted). Public interest groups argue that moving too quickly to cut off public disclosure of business data would be unwise, claiming that such a move would shield such embarrassing information as "drug company tests on humans [that are performed] before completing animal tests, toxic chemicals dumped into streams and rivers, inspection reports of the Department of Agriculture concerning unwholesome meat, [and] crecy and away from disclosure. 261 The central purpose doctrine was ostensibly intended to return FOIA to its original purposes. In deciding the central purpose doctrine cases, however, the Supreme Court ignored one of FOIA's important original purposes. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act had required agencies to disclose information only "to persons properly and directly concerned." 262 The passage of FOIA in 1966 was specifically intended to eliminate "the test of who shall have the right to different information."
263 That change was essential to the new scheme that FOIA established. 264 FOIA represents the basic idea that information in the government's possession should be made available to anyone for any purpose, unless the information is explicitly exempted. 265 It is too simplistic to suggest that FOIA has one single, central purpose that should override this equally important ideal. Limiting the scope of FOIA also ignores the collateral benefits of having a broad public disclosure law, such as "ensur [ing] for the individual citizen a sense of empowerment and control over a government that can at times appear monolithic and imperious."
266 It ignores the idea that if "information is power, then to deny public ownership of government information is to deny public control over the government."
267 Limiting the amount of information available through FOIA does limit, in a sense, the amount of power we have over our government. Since government resources are not infinite, however, it is proper, in some cases, to place a price on access to certain types of information. FOIA's current fee provisions appropriately balance the philosophy of open government with fiscal realities, however, and it would be unwise to expand the central purpose doctrine. 268 261. See Beall, supra note 23, at 1262 (arguing that the use of the central purpose doctrine as a gatekeeper "would work a dramatic volte face from the principles of FOIA, improperly shifting the Act from one that favors disclosure to one that favors secrecy" 265. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3. This 1965 Senate Report states that the primary purposes of the law were "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information wrongfully withheld." Id.
266. Beall, supra note 23, at 1299. 267. Id. 268. See discussion supra Part I.C (arguing that the 1986 Amendments strike the proper balance between keeping government activities open to the light of public scrutiny and fiscal realities).
B. Fee provisions: Let the Agencies Keep the Money
In passing E-FOIA, Congress recognized that inadequate agency resources are one of the primary causes of delay in FOIA administration. 269 This is not a novel insight; previous legislators, as well as scholars and agency heads, have all highlighted the need for more FOIA funding to ensure the effective operation of the statute. 270 Congress attempted to recoup some of the costs of FOIA by amending the statute's fee structure in 1986. 271 In 1992, agencies spent about $108 million processing FOIA requests, and charged $8 million in fees. 272 Under the current scheme, however, agencies do not keep those fees; the money is deposited in the Treasury. 273 This fee collection structure does nothing to help agencies process FOIA requests more rapidly.
In 1996, Senator Leahy introduced a bill that would have permitted agencies to collect a portion of FOIA fees directly if, looking at all of their requests, they were in "substantial compliance" with FOIA's time limits. 274 The purpose of the Senate bill was to give agencies an incentive to comply with the statutory time limits. 275 
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These fee-sharing provisions, however, failed to make it into the final draft of E-FOIA. While Senator Leahy had good intentions, his bill would not have been the most effective solution. First, it would have helped the agencies that needed the least assistance, while the agencies with the biggest backlogs would not have received the additional money needed to reduce their backlogs. 276 Second, an agency can be in "substantial compliance" by either providing responsive documents or by denying requests. 277 Since the stated purpose of the proposed requirement was to provide agencies with a financial incentive to reduce backlogs, it is possible that agencies would have denied requests in order to attain "substantial compliance." This would have threatened to shift FOIA's delicate balance towards initial nondisclosure, an undesirable result. Finally, the administrative costs to the GAO would have outweighed the benefits of the procedure.
278
Under the provision, the GAO might have been required to conduct a substantial number of FOIA audits annually. 279 Since the GAO's budget, like that of many agencies, has recently been cut, some critics argued that "meeting demands for FOIA audits would diminish the agency's ability to carry out other functions." 280 One positive feature of the Leahy proposal is that it required that agencies use the fees collected to improve their FOIA processing capabilities. 281 That aspect of the Leahy bill could be integrated into a provision that would allow agencies to keep all the FOIA fees that they collect, irrespective of their level of compliance with the time limits. 282 This solution would eliminate the expense of agency performance audits, and, "rather than simply rewarding agencies that already are in compliance with FOIA time limits, funds [would] become available to those agencies that experience backlogs to assist them in overcoming their timing problems." 283 276. See id. at 21 (estimating that, in 1992, agencies that would likely be eligible to retain fees accounted for only about 10% of the total fees collected, while the four agencies with the largest backlogs accounted for almost 75% of the total fees collected).
277. See S. 1090, § 6(a). 278. See Gellman Testimony, supra note 158, at 74 (stating that the provision was "guaranteed to lose money for the government").
279. 
CONCLUSION
FOIA is not perfect. It is often used by the "wrong" people for the "wrong" reasons. 284 But the basic principle underlying FOIA should not be abandoned. In the context of a $1.63 trillion federal budget, 285 the $100 to $200 million that FOIA costs each year is minuscule. When one considers that FOIA spending is roughly equivalent to federal spending on military bands, 286 FOIA suddenly does not seem so extravagant and wasteful. Spending $200 million or more on open government is worth the price even after "the era of big government is over." 287 FOIA today is very different than its creators could have imagined; it is indeed "a far cry from John Q. Public finding out how his government works." 288 cretive federal government, especially one as large and impersonal as the current one, is reason enough to continue efforts to perfect the statute. FOIA has many obvious benefits, but there are hidden benefits as well. Simply having a public disclosure statute in the United States Code "serves as an effective deterrent to government waste, abuse, and mismanagement." 291 With all of the benefits-tangible and intangible-FOIA is worth the cost. As Judge Patricia Wald observed: "It takes constant vigilance, commitment, and common sense to make any law work. I hope we as citizens have all these qualitiesin large measure-to keep the FOIA around for a long time and to make it work." 292 E-FOIA is illustrative of Congress's adherence to this goal. In passing E-FOIA, Congress demonstrated both a willingness to adapt FOIA to changing times and a desire to continue searching for ways to make FOIA more effective. Internet publication of government information will facilitate broad public access to information without requiring people to bear the added time and expense of making a FOIA request. E-FOIA's administrative improvements are a small step toward increased efficiency in FOIA processing. Nevertheless, E-FOIA should not be the final effort to perfect FOIA. Future efforts should be directed at funding agency FOIA-processing divisions. Only adequate funding will enable agencies to eliminate backlogs and delay and allow FOIA to reach its full potential. , at A17 (asserting that FOIA "has done more to inhibit the abuse of Government power . . . than any legislation in our lifetime"). This deterrent value exists because "[a]gency managers know that many of their actions are subject to public oversight through documents obtained by the press and by citizens through the FOIA." H.R. REP. NO. 99-832, at 9.
292. Wald, supra note 25, at 683 (emphasis added).
